The Volcker Rule\u27s Hedging Exemption by Winters, Spencer A.
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Volume 111
2012
The Volcker Rule's Hedging Exemption
Spencer A. Winters
University of Michigan Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the
Securities Law Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review First Impressions by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Spencer A. Winters, The Volcker Rule's Hedging Exemption, 111 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 90 (2012).
Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol111/iss1/2
Winters MLR FI FTP.doc 9/4/2012 11:19 AM 
90 
THE VOLCKER RULE’S HEDGING EXEMPTION 
Spencer A. Winters* 
The comment period for the proposed regulations to be promulgated un-
der the Volcker Rule expired on February 13, 2012.1 The rulemakers 
received over 16,000 comments during that period, in what one commenta-
tor described as a “fecal storm.”2 Though that description is hopefully an 
exaggeration, it is safe to say that the Rule’s implementation has been con-
tentious. The Volcker Rule, named for former chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Paul Volcker, is a component of the Dodd-Frank Act,3 which Con-
gress passed in response to the recent financial crisis. The Rule’s statutory 
provision charges the nation’s financial regulators with issuing a body of 
regulations that expand upon the statutory provision.4 The rulemakers have 
issued a set of proposed regulations,5 which were meant to go into effect no 
later than July 21, 2012 but were overdue as of the publication of this Es-
say.6 
The Rule’s statutory provision entails a simple prohibition on proprie-
tary trading, followed by a definition of proprietary trading and a long list of 
exemptions. It states plainly that a banking entity7 (which I will simply call 
a “bank”) “shall not . . . engage in proprietary trading.”8 It then defines  
                                                                                                                      
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2013. I would like to thank Andrew Hartlage, Professor Hwa-
Jin Kim, Sarah Palmer, Joanna Rogow, and my parents. 
 1. See Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading, 77 Fed. Reg. 23, 23–24 (Jan. 3, 2012). 
 2. Moshe Silver, Volcker Rule Comments: The Good, the Bad, and the Ridiculous, 
FORTUNE (Feb. 29, 2012), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/02/29/volcker-rule-comments/. 
 3. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The Volcker Rule is codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 1851 (Supp. IV 2010). 
 4. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b). The regulations will be issued jointly by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank, the Federal 
Depository Insurance Corporation, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Prohibi-
tions on Proprietary Trading, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846 (Nov. 7, 2011).  
 5. Id.  
 6. WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, THE DODD-FRANK ACT—TWO YEARS LATER 4, 
available at http://www.weil.com/files/upload/Weil_Alert_Dodd_Frank_Act_Two_Years_ 
Later.pdf; Suzy Khimm, Will Regulators Get It Right on the Volcker Rule?, WASHINGTON 
POST (July 11, 2012, 11:12 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/ 
07/11/will-regulators-get-it-right-on-the-volcker-rule/. 
 7. “Banking entity” is defined broadly to include not only insured depository institu-
tions but also bank holding companies and their subsidiaries. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(1) 
(2006). 
 8. Id. § 1851(a)(1)(A). The statutory provision also states that “a banking entity shall 
not . . . acquire or retain a hedge fund or a private equity fund.” Id. § 1851(a)(1)(B).  
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proprietary trading as transacting in securities or derivatives for the purpose 
of benefitting from short-term price movements.9  
Of the Rule’s laundry list of exemptions,10 this Essay will focus on the 
hedging exemption. The hedging exemption allows banking entities to en-
gage in proprietary trading for the purpose of undertaking “[r]isk-mitigating 
hedging activities in connection with and related to individual or aggregated 
positions . . . designed to reduce the specific risks to the bank in connection 
with and related to such positions.”11 On its face, the hedging exemption 
allows a bank to bypass the Volcker Rule if the bank is adopting a given 
proprietary position in order to reduce a specific risk associated with another 
of the bank’s positions. 
The proposed regulations significantly expand upon the statutory provi-
sion. They provide for a rebuttable presumption that a position held by a 
bank for sixty days or less is a proprietary trade.12 A bank could rebut this 
presumption by demonstrating that it did not take the position principally 
for purposes proscribed by the Volcker Rule,13 namely benefitting from 
short-term price movements.14 Even a short-term trade designed to hedge 
another short-term trade would trigger this presumption, and the fact that it 
was motivated by risk reduction would not rebut the presumption.15  
It may seem peculiar that the proposed regulations proscribe taking posi-
tions for the purpose of hedging. However, the fact that the statutory 
provision contains a hedging exemption at all indicates that Congress meant 
that positions taken for the purpose of hedging other short-term positions 
should qualify as prima facie proprietary trades. Such a position will then 
only be exempt if it meets the specific requirements of the hedging exemp-
tion. 
The proposed regulations provide a set of requirements under which a 
particular proprietary trade would qualify as an exempt hedge. In addition to 
certain procedural requirements,16 the hedging exemption under the pro-
posed regulations has three substantive requirements. First, the proprietary 
trade must mitigate “one or more specific risks,” including market risk, cred-
it risk, counterparty risk, currency risk, interest rate risk, or basis risk.17 
Second, the proprietary trade must be “reasonably correlated” to that specif-
                                                                                                                      
 9. This definition is my synthesis of two definitions in the statutory provision, the 
definition of “proprietary trading,” id. § 1851(h)(4), and the definition of “trading account,” id. 
§ 1851(h)(6). 
 10. See id. § 1851(d). 
 11. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(C). 
 12. Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading § _.3(b)(2)(ii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,945–46. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. § _.3(b)(2)(i)(A), 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,945. 
 15. See id. § _.3(b)(2)(i)(A)(4), 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,945. 
 16. See Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading § _.5(b)(1), (b)(2)(i), 76 Fed. Reg. at 
68,948.  
 17. Id. § _.5(b)(2)(ii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,948. 
Winters MLR FI FTP.doc 9/4/2012 11:19 AM 
92 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 111:90 
ic risk.18 Third, at the “inception of the hedge,” the proprietary trade must 
“not give rise . . . to significant exposures that were not already present . . . 
and that are not hedged contemporaneously.”19 I call this final requirement 
the “no-new-risks” requirement. 
In this Essay, I briefly discuss potential applications of the Volcker 
Rule’s hedging exemption. In Part I, I make note of the fact that many hedg-
es put on by banking entities will not be “proprietary trades” in the first 
instance because they will be long-term hedges. Although these long-term 
hedges need not rely on the hedging exemption to be lawful, short-term 
hedges must. In Part II, I argue that the no-new-risks requirement, if read 
literally, would render the hedging exemption inert because all hedges create 
new risks. In Part III, I propose a simple fix to the no-new-risks requirement 
that either the rulemakers should incorporate into the regulations before 
promulgation or that decisionmakers should read into the regulations after 
promulgation.  
I. SHORT VS. LONG-TERM HEDGES 
Many of the hedges that banking entities enter into—namely, long-term 
hedges—will not be prohibited by the Volcker Rule in the first instance and 
thus will not need to meet the three requirements of the hedging exemption. 
Imagine a federally insured depository institution that enters into a five-year 
fixed-for-floating rate swap, a transaction designed to reduce the bank’s ex-
posure to interest rate risk over the next five years. Interest rate risk refers to 
the possibility of a reduction in gross interest income due to a change in 
market interest rates.20 The most acute source of interest rate risk is the prac-
tice of taking short-term deposits and making long-term loans, which is 
called “mismatching maturities.”21  
Banking entities can hedge interest rate risk with a derivative security 
called a fixed-for-floating rate interest rate swap,22 also known as a plain 
vanilla swap. In this context, a plain vanilla swap is a contract whereby the 
bank agrees with a counterparty to pay a fixed rate of interest in exchange 
for a floating rate of interest.23 By trading a fixed rate for a floating rate, a 
bank can reduce its exposure to interest rate risk because the transaction 
reverses the maturity mismatch that created the interest rate risk in the first 
place.  
It might be tempting to begin applying the three hedging exemption re-
quirements to this transaction, but doing so is unnecessary because this 
hedge is long-term in design and thus is not a prohibited proprietary trade. A 
position is only a prohibited proprietary trade if the bank uses it in an  
                                                                                                                      
 18. Id. § _.5(b)(2)(iii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,948. 
 19. Id. § _.5(b)(2)(iv), 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,948. 
 20. JOËL BESSIS, RISK MANAGEMENT IN BANKING 85 (3d ed. 2010). 
 21. Id. at 84–85. 
 22. Id. at 92–93. 
 23. See id. 
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attempt to profit from short-term price movements or to hedge short-term 
price movements.24 Assuming this five-year swap is not closed out within 
sixty days, it will likely avoid regulatory scrutiny all together. However, 
even if the trade is closed within sixty days—say, because the bank’s view 
on future interest rates changes—the bank can rebut the sixty-day presump-
tion by showing that, at the outset, the transaction was long-term in design. 
The same principles apply to shield other types of long-term hedges from 
the Volcker Rule’s prohibition, like long-term hedges against credit risk us-
ing credit default swaps. 
Of course, interest rate swaps, credit default swaps, and other derivative 
securities are not necessarily useless for short-term hedging. For example, 
credit default swaps might be used to hedge against market-making activi-
ties in bonds and other fixed-income securities. In the event that a bank does 
use these derivatives in this fashion, it might well run into the new risks 
problem discussed in the next Part. 
II. THE FLAW IN THE NO-NEW-RISKS REQUIREMENT 
This Part argues that, taken literally, the no-new-risks requirement of the 
hedging exemption will render the exemption inert. Consider a bank that 
uses put options to hedge its market-making securities inventory against 
market risk. Market risk refers to the possibility of trading losses due to a 
change in the prevailing price of a given asset.25 Market making26 is one 
activity that can expose a bank to market risk,27 a risk banking entities can 
hedge using a derivative called a put option.28 A put option is a contract that 
gives the holder the right but not the obligation to sell an asset at some time 
in the future at a price agreed upon today.29 The agreed-upon price at which 
the holder can sell the asset is called the exercise price or the strike price.30 
A bank can thus use a put option as insurance against a price drop because 
the put locks in a selling price for the bank. The bank buys and sells puts, 
often in the same trading day, to maintain a consistent level of insurance 
against market risk. 
                                                                                                                      
 24. See Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading § _.3(b)(2)(i)(A), 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,945; 
supra text accompanying note 9 (setting forth the Volcker Rule’s definition of a proprietary 
trade).  
 25. See PIETRO PENZA & VIPUL K. BANSAL, MEASURING MARKET RISK WITH VALUE 
AT RISK 21 (2001). 
 26. Market making involves standing ready to buy or sell securities at the prevailing 
market rate. Market Maker, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mktmaker.htm. This typically requires that the bank hold an in-
ventory of those securities on its balance sheet. See id. 
 27. See Narayan Y. Naik & Pradeep K. Yadav, Risk Management with Derivatives by 
Dealers and Market Quality in Government Bond Markets, 58 J. FIN. 1873 (2003).  
 28. See BESSIS, supra note 20, at 75. 
 29. Id. at 70; see also Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and 
Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 637 (1973). 
 30. Black & Scholes, supra note 29, at 637. 
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By way of example, consider a bank that is a market maker in Microsoft 
stock. The bank takes a $300 million position in Microsoft stock at the 
opening bell, buying 10 million shares for $30 each. As insurance against a 
decline in the value of this $300 million in inventory, the bank can purchase 
10 million put options on Microsoft stock struck at $30 and expiring in 30 
days. This gives the bank the right but not the obligation to sell 10 million 
shares of Microsoft stock to the option counterparty for $300 million at any 
time in the next 30 days. Thus, if bad news breaks about Microsoft, and the 
shares drop by $2 each, causing a $20 million loss on the bank’s position, 
the bank can sell the shares to its counterparty for $300 million, thus avoid-
ing the loss.31 Of course, this insurance comes at a cost to the bank, the cost 
of buying the put option in the first place—say $1 per option or $10 million 
in total.32 
Because the bank buys and sells the puts within a sixty-day period, the 
transactions would trigger the rebuttable presumption under the proposed 
regulations. The bank would not be able to rebut this presumption because 
the trades were designed to hedge short-term risks: the short-term market 
risk associated with market making.33 
Thus, assuming neither the market-making exemption nor any other ex-
emption applies, the bank will be forced to invoke the hedging exemption. 
Again, under the proposed regulations, the hedging exemption would have 
three requirements: that the trade hedge a specific risk, that it be reasonably 
correlated thereto, and that it not create new risks. The proposed regulations 
specifically list “market risk” as an example of a specific risk, so this trade 
easily meets the first requirement.34 Second, assuming the put options refer-
ence the specific asset in the bank’s market-making inventory, the positions 
should have near perfect correlation, thus satisfying the second requirement. 
However, the third requirement—that the hedge create no new risks—is 
problematic. The proposed regulations specifically provide that, to qualify 
for the hedging exemption, a given proprietary trade must “not give rise, at 
the inception of the hedge, to significant exposures that were not already 
present in the individual or aggregated positions, contracts, or other holdings 
                                                                                                                      
 31. In the real world, the option seller would not actually buy the stock from the bank 
(which is called “taking delivery”). Instead, the option seller would simply pay the bank the 
$20 million by which the asset price is below the strike price. BESSIS, supra note 21, at 70. 
 32. This was the approximate price of thirty day near-the-money puts on Microsoft 
stocks on March 2, 2012, when Microsoft shares were trading at around $32 per share. See 
Microsoft Corp. (MSFT) Options, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ 
op?s=MSFT+Options (last visited Mar. 2, 2012). 
 33. Market making is itself an activity exempt from the prohibition on proprietary trad-
ing. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2010). There is thus the distinct possibility that 
trades designed to mitigate market-making activities would fall under the market-making 
exemption in addition to the hedging exemption. See id. (exempting “market-making-related 
activities” (emphasis added)). The market-making exemption is outside the scope of this Es-
say. However, one can readily conceive of a hedging scenario that does not involve an 
otherwise exempt activity. I use the market-making example because I believe it is relatively 
easy to understand. 
 34. Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading § _.5(b)(2)(ii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,948. 
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of a covered banking entity and that are not hedged contemporaneously.”35 
However, hedges invariably give rise to at least one new risk: counterparty 
risk, namely the risk that the hedging counterparty defaults on its obliga-
tion.36 Thus, taken literally, the no-new-risks requirement could render this 
exemption useless. 
The proposed regulations’ allowance of new risks if they are “hedged 
contemporaneously” would appear at first blush to be a potential solution to 
the new risks problem. If we take as true the proposition that all hedges give 
rise to new risks, this allowance simply creates a circularity problem. True, 
the bank could hedge the risk that its option counterparty defaults by pur-
chasing insurance against that risk. Yet purchasing insurance exposes the 
bank to new counterparty risk: the risk that the insurer defaults. Insuring 
against insurer default poses the risk that the secondary insurer defaults. 
And so on.  
Another potential solution that likewise fails to bear fruit is the fact that 
the no-new-risks requirement only prohibits “significant” new risks. The 
risks of hedging are far from insignificant. For example, the liquidity risk 
associated with margin calls on derivatives can cause severe financial dis-
tress.37 Likewise, for an example of counterparty risk wreaking havoc on 
venerable institutions, one need look no further than the financial crisis, 
wherein AIG nearly defaulted on billions of dollars of credit default swaps 
before receiving a government bailout.38 
III. A SOLUTION TO THE FLAW 
The rulemakers could best solve the new risks problem by amending the 
regulations before promulgation. The simple fix to the problem would be to 
change the language of the third requirement to something along the lines 
of: the proprietary trade “does not give rise, at the inception of the hedge, to 
significant exposures that were not already present . . . and that are not 
hedged contemporaneously, other than those risks inherently a part of hedg-
ing.”39 
However, even if the rulemakers do not make this fix, the above is a 
plausible reading of the Volcker Rule as it stands. The second requirement 
that the proposed regulations put on the hedging exemption, the requirement 
that the trade be reasonably correlated to the position it is meant to hedge, 
supports this reading. The second requirement is a restriction on a specific 
type of risk: the risk that a position designed as a hedge does not perfectly 
                                                                                                                      
 35. Id. § _.5(b)(2)(iv), 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,948. 
 36. BESSIS, supra note 21, at 28–30; 
 37. E.g., SATYAJIT DAS, TRADERS, GUNS & MONEY 96 (2006) (recounting a $1 billion 
margin call precipitated by an otherwise well-designed hedge, which caused severe financial 
distress to the hedger). 
 38. A.I.G.’s Payouts to Companies Draw Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2009, 7:20 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/aigs-bailout-priorities-are-in-critics-cross-
hairs/. 
 39. Cf. Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading § _.5(b)(2)(iv), 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,948. 
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offset the position it is meant to hedge, which is called basis risk.40 The se-
cond requirement, in not requiring perfect correlation of risks, allows the 
bank to assume a reasonable quantum of basis risk when it puts on a hedge. 
If the third requirement, the no-new-risks requirement, were construed to 
prohibit the assumption of any new risks, then the second requirement’s 
partial restriction on the assumption of basis risk would be superfluous. 
Therefore, even if the rulemakers do not fix the no-new-risks requirement 
before promulgation, those in a position to interpret this provision should 
read it as permitting risks inherent in hedging. 
CONCLUSION 
The Volcker Rule prohibits banking entities from entering into transac-
tions in order to benefit from short-term price movements but provides an 
exemption for transactions designed to hedge existing risks. Many hedging 
transactions will not need to rely on the hedging exemption in order to avoid 
the Volcker Rule’s prohibition because they will be long-term trades. Those 
that are short-term in nature, however, may encounter a problem with the 
Volcker Rule’s proposed regulations that stems from their requirement that 
an exempt hedge create no new risks. The simple solution is to read the no-
new-risks requirement so as not to apply to those risks inherent in hedging, 
like counterparty risk and basis risk. 
                                                                                                                      
 40. See DAS, supra note 37, at 27–28 (2006). 
